As Nigeria approaches the 2027 general elections, Northern Nigeria faces a fundamental strategic choice: should its politics revolve principally around producing the next president or securing a better future for its people? To make the right choice, it is my stand that the North must learn from the political miscalculations of 2003 and 2015.
Rather than make the return of the presidency to the region an inflexible demand, it should negotiate a Northern Development Compact that protects its interests, preserves national alliances and strengthens democratic stability.
The distinction is crucial. A Northern president is a political objective; Northern development is a regional necessity. The two may coincide, but they are not synonymous. The North must therefore reflect soberly on its political history, particularly the consequences of insisting that presidential power must return to the region, even when the national circumstances demand broader strategic thinking.
As a historian, I know the cost of repeating history. The political controversies surrounding the 2003 and 2015 elections are still fresh, and they offer important lessons to discerning minds. In 2003, arguments over the return of presidential power to the North contributed to intense conflict within the presidency and partisan contestation over President Olusegun Obasanjo’s re-election. That conflict substantially defined Nigeria’s democratic trajectory, leading to the present national politics. In 2015, the determination to remove President Goodluck Jonathan and return power to the North produced another major realignment of national political forces.
These two episodes were different in their circumstances and outcomes. Yet both illustrate the dangers of allowing personal ambitions shape regional calculations about presidential power to overshadow the wider questions of national stability, political relationships and democratic maturity. The lesson is not that the North should abandon its presidential aspirations. It is that such aspirations must be pursued with strategic judgement, rather than treated as an overriding principle regardless of its ultimate underlying negative consequences.
I write with particular responsibility regarding 2015. I played a significant role in persuading late Mohammadu Buhari to return to the presidential contest and in the broader political project that helped produce the All Progressives Congress (APC) and its electoral victory. I therefore have a responsibility to reflect on the consequences of that realignment. Although the immediate objective of 2015 was achieved – Jonathan lost and Buhari became president – the political consequences extended far beyond the election itself.
The first casualty was the North’s traditional alliance with the Niger Delta, which was critically severed, while the relationship with the South-West, through Bola Tinubu, became central to the new political formula. That new alliance helped shape the transitions of 2015 and 2023. Yet, in my assessment, the Buhari administration failed to deliver the transformation we expected, while Northern support for Tinubu in 2023 became selective, reluctant, selfish and transactional. And now, as opposition to Tinubu’s continuation in office beyond one term, like Jonathan’s, grows in most parts of the North, we must ask whether another uncompromising regional contest could weaken the South-West relationship and its long-term effects on the North’s political standing in Nigeria’s power equation.
The January and July 1966 coups and the ensuing civil war offer a different, far more tragic historical warning: political ruptures can damage interregional trust for generations. Electoral realignments are not equivalent to military coups or civil war, but history consistently reminds us that political relationships can be destroyed more quickly than they can be rebuilt. The North must not repeat the mistake of pursuing an immediate political objective without adequately considering the alliances and opportunities it may lose in the process.
In any case, as we have seen in Buhari’s presidency, political power is not synonymous with development. Yes, the North possesses considerable electoral strength. But its electoral numbers alone cannot translate into presidential victory for the North. In the system we operate, the President and Vice President must win a nationwide election, and to do so, they have to appeal to all ethnic groups and to a whole host of other interests across other zones of the country. In such a large democracy, no one group or region would ever be big enough to always dominate the political process. This would mean that national politics would have to be dominated by ever-shifting coalitions of ethnic, religious, regional and other interests rather than by one majority bloc. This means the North, like any other region, must align with others to gain presidential power. Nor can the North’s large numbers alone resolve its insecurity, educational disadvantage, unemployment, poverty or infrastructural deficits.
These variables expose two fundamental facts of our political system: that no region can do it alone electorally and the tendency to equate having a president from a region with achieving success for its people. Enduring alliances shape political conditions in which a region secures its long-term interest. Yes, regional representation matters in a diverse federation, and the North is entitled to pursue the presidency through lawful democratic means. But geography alone cannot be the sole criterion for political choice, nor should the slogan that power must return to the North become a doctrine that prevents us from considering more beneficial alternatives.
The question, therefore, should not merely be who will occupy Aso Rock, but what any candidate seeking Northern support is prepared to deliver – and how the region can hold that candidate accountable. What is the value of a Northern president if our communities remain unsafe, our children are denied education, our young people cannot find productive employment and our economies continue to lag behind their potential?
The North should also recognise the risk of political isolation. A bitter confrontation with President Tinubu could weaken its relationship with the South-West; in denying President Jonathan a second term, the North’s relations with the Niger Delta have already experienced significant political shifts, while engagement with the South-East remains complicated by historical and contemporary tensions. The Middle Belt, too, submerged within the North, contains diverse communities whose interests cannot simply be assumed to coincide with those of every other Northern constituency. None of these regions is politically homogeneous, and no alliance is permanent. Nevertheless, the North would be unwise to disregard the strategic value of cooperation across regional boundaries.
Having raised these issues and arguments, I propose that the North, through its non-partisan organizations such as the League of Northern Democrats (LND), Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Northern Elders Forum (NEF), Middle Belt Forum (MBF) and other willing stakeholders, initiate a process to develop a common Northern Development Plan. Already, these organizations have such development plans. Let us harmonize them into a single plan in a way that it identifies the region’s priority needs and translates them into measurable targets, realistic timelines, funding arrangements and clear institutional responsibilities and approaches and negotiate with the president on the basis of the plan.
Its core commitments should include:
Security: confronting terrorism, banditry, kidnapping and communal violence, while restoring the livelihoods of displaced communities.
Employment: ensuring massive employment for our youths.
Education: reducing the number of out-of-school children, improving literacy and expanding vocational training.
Economic transformation: modernising agriculture, developing livestock and agro-industrial value chains, promoting manufacturing and creating productive employment.
Infrastructure: improving roads, waterways, railways, electricity, irrigation, water supply and digital connectivity.
Healthcare and social protection: strengthening primary healthcare, addressing malnutrition and reducing extreme deprivation.
Inclusive governance: promoting constitutionalism, the rule of law and equitable development while respecting the diversity of Northern communities.
This would fundamentally change the basis of Northern political engagement. Instead of endorsing a candidate and bargaining for benefits afterwards, the region would first define its priorities, negotiate commitments and assess the available choices against an agreed standard. If President Tinubu or another candidate presents a more convincing programme, Northern stakeholders should retain the freedom to consider such alternatives.
This is neither an endorsement of President Tinubu nor a rejection of other presidential candidates. It is an attempt to ensure that the North’s political influence produces tangible benefits for its people. The North must not close the idea of opening a political conversation with President Tinubu with a view to extracting a better bargain from him in exchange for its collective support. Nor should the compact become a bargain for appointments, contracts or personal rewards, as it happened in 2023. Its purpose must be public policy, development and accountability.
Lest I am misunderstood, this deliberate engagement is not a weakness on the part of the North. Some may argue that my proposition weakens the demand for a Northern president. I argue the opposite: a region that can organise its interests, define its priorities and negotiate with competing candidates is exercising political strength. To this end, the North should pursue three parallel objectives: build consensus around a common development agenda, negotiate openly with President Tinubu or other candidates and preserve its political independence if no satisfactory agreement emerges. This approach neither abandons regional aspirations nor allows them to dictate every political decision. It recognises that the North’s interests are too important to be reduced to the ambitions of individual politicians.
There is also a compelling national interest in reducing the risk of post-election violence and instability. A polarised contest or widely disputed results could provoke serious unrest, although neither a particular electoral outcome nor violent reactions should be treated as inevitable. The North, already burdened by insecurity and economic hardship, has much to lose from another cycle of political violence. Peace must be built through credible institutions, constitutional processes, negotiations, inclusion and justice. A development compact may not guarantee peace, but it can make substantive policy commitments central to political competition and provide a constructive channel for addressing regional concerns.
The lessons of 2003 and 2015 should encourage reflection, not recrimination. They should remind Northern leaders that the pursuit of presidential power without sufficient attention to its wider consequences can create problems that outlast the politicians who initiated it. We must not repeat those missteps in 2027 by treating the return of power to the North as an absolute condition, regardless of the cost to our alliances, national stability or developmental prospects. This does not mean that the North should surrender its presidential ambition. It means that ambition must be informed by history, strategy and clear objective.
The true measure of political leadership is not simply whether it can produce a president or determine who occupies Aso Rock. It is whether it can convert political influence into security, education, prosperity, justice and opportunity for its people. Let us therefore come together and negotiate the future, not mortgage it. Let us pursue power with wisdom, alliances with foresight and development with determination. This, to me, is ultimately in the enlightened self interest of the North and the nation.
