Why Abuja Needs Its Own Local Police Service Now—Retd. US Army Captain

Retd. U.S. Army Captain Bishop C. Johnson argues that excluding the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) from Nigeria’s state policing reforms is “constitutionally unnecessary, operationally dangerous, and democratically inconsistent.”

Citing Section 299 of the 1999 Constitution, the proposal urges the creation of a local FCT Police Service to address local security dynamics, suggesting the National Assembly can provide the necessary legal framework.

In a letter to the Presidential Working Group on the State Police Bill, he asserts that excluding the FCT will be democratically absurd.

You can read the full analysis at the source letter provided:

The Chairman
Presidential Working Group on the National Policing Bill
Office of the Chief of Staff to the President
State House, Abuja

A CASE FOR A LOCAL POLICE SERVICE FOR THE FEDERAL CAPITAL TERRITORY

Contribution to the Ongoing Public Discussion on Nigeria’s Police Bill and State Police Framework

By Capt. Bishop C. Johnson
United States Army (Retd.)

The ongoing national discussion on the proposed reform and decentralisation of Nigeria’s policing architecture presents an important opportunity to address a fundamental gap that must not be overlooked: the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) should have its own locally constituted police service.

Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory, should have its own local police service constituted primarily by recruiting residents of the FCT who understand its unique terrain, settlement patterns, demographic mix, communities, languages, social networks and security dynamics.

The decision to exclude the FCT from the emerging dual policing architecture simply because it lacks an elected governor and a State House of Assembly would perpetuate, within the nation’s capital, the very defects of centralised policing that the country has now rejected for the 36 states.

Such exclusion is constitutionally unnecessary, operationally dangerous and democratically inconsistent.

The arguments for decentralising policing across the states apply, in substantial measure, and in some respects with even greater force, to the Federal Capital Territory. If the objective of police reform is to bring policing closer to the people, improve intelligence gathering, increase police presence, strengthen accountability and ensure that policing is responsive to local security realities, then the FCT cannot reasonably be excluded from that reform simply because its constitutional governance structure differs from that of the states.

Indeed, excluding the FCT would create a contradiction at the heart of the proposed decentralisation.

Nigeria cannot credibly argue that a centralised police structure is inadequate for the 36 states because it is too distant from local communities, while simultaneously maintaining essentially the same centralised arrangement for the FCT, where the nation’s most important political, diplomatic, administrative and strategic institutions are located.

Constitutional Equivalence Already Exists

One of the principal arguments against establishing a local police service for the FCT appears to be that the FCT is not a state and therefore has neither a governor elected by its residents nor a State House of Assembly.

That argument, in my view, does not adequately address the constitutional and administrative realities of the Federal Capital Territory.

Section 299 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides that the provisions of the Constitution shall apply to the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, “as if it were one of the States of the Federation.”

That constitutional provision is fundamental to this discussion.

Consequently, the legislative and executive arrangements applicable to the states have constitutional relevance to the FCT, subject to the peculiar institutional structure established for the Territory.

In practical terms:

• Legislative powers that would vest in a State House of Assembly vest in the National Assembly with respect to the FCT.
• Executive powers that would vest in a State Governor are exercised in relation to the FCT by the President, through the constitutional and administrative framework established for the Territory.
• The Minister of the Federal Capital Territory serves as the day-to-day administrative and executive head of the Territory under the authority of the President.

The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria therefore exercises constitutional executive authority over the FCT and does so administratively through the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory.

The FCT Minister consequently occupies a role that, in the administration and management of the Territory, bears significant functional similarities to that exercised by governors within their respective states.

This is not a novel or strained interpretation of the constitutional structure of the FCT. Nigerian jurisprudence has recognised the special constitutional position of the Territory and the application of constitutional provisions to it as if it were one of the states.

There is therefore no institutional vacuum that prevents the creation of an FCT Police Service under the same broad constitutional logic now being applied to the states.

If governors are to be entrusted with a decentralised policing platform because they are responsible for the security and welfare of the people within their jurisdictions, then there is a compelling argument for providing the FCT Minister with an equivalent policing platform appropriate to the constitutional status of the FCT.

The question should therefore not simply be whether the FCT has a governor called a governor.

The more important question is:

Who is constitutionally and administratively responsible for governing the FCT, and what policing instruments should that authority have to discharge its responsibility for the protection of lives and property?

The answer is clear: the Federal Government, acting through the constitutional framework of the FCT and the Minister of the FCT, already exercises governmental responsibility over the Territory.

Consequently, the absence of a conventional state government should not automatically become a reason to deny FCT residents the benefits of localised policing.

If governors are to appoint Commissioners of Police, subject to the applicable confirmation and oversight arrangements, and issue general policy directives concerning public safety and public order within their states, the Minister of the FCT, acting under presidential authority, should exercise equivalent powers with respect to an FCT Police Service, with the National Assembly performing the corresponding legislative, confirmatory and oversight functions appropriate to the constitutional status of the Territory.

To deny this functional equivalence is to treat the constitutional “as if” language of Section 299 as optional when it is inconvenient to apply it.

The National Assembly Can Provide the Legislative Framework

The same argument applies to the legislative question.

The Federal Capital Territory is directly under the legislative authority of the National Assembly. The National Assembly has, for decades, exercised legislative authority concerning the FCT and has enacted laws governing its administration, institutions, development and public affairs.

Therefore, the absence of a State House of Assembly should not constitute an insurmountable constitutional obstacle to establishing an FCT Police Service.

If State Houses of Assembly are contemplated as part of the legislative oversight architecture for State Police Services, then the National Assembly can perform the corresponding legislative and oversight function for an FCT Police Service.

There is already an established institutional mechanism through which the FCT is legislated for. The National Assembly can therefore enact specific legislation establishing the FCT Police Service and defining its relationship with the Nigeria Police Force and other federal security agencies.

In practical terms, legislation establishing an FCT Police Service can clearly define:

• its constitutional and statutory foundation;
• command and control structure;
• recruitment requirements;
• operational jurisdiction;
• relationship with the Nigeria Police Force;
• relationship with other federal security agencies;
• funding arrangements;
• disciplinary procedures;
• professional standards;
• human-rights safeguards;
• legislative oversight;
• civilian accountability;
• inter-agency cooperation;
• mechanisms for preventing political abuse; and
• procedures for resolving jurisdictional conflicts between federal and FCT policing authorities.

The FCT does not have to be constitutionally transformed into a state before a rational, accountable and locally responsive policing structure can be created for it.

The Core Rationale for Decentralisation Applies with Full Force to the FCT

The agitation for state police rests on four interrelated pillars. Each applies, with equal or greater force, to the Federal Capital Territory.

1. Localisation of Policing Knowledge and Presence

Effective policing is inherently local.

One of the central reasons for the agitation for decentralised policing is the recognition that policing is most effective when police officers understand the communities they police.

Security is not merely about weapons, uniforms, vehicles and numbers.

It is also about knowledge.

Officers recruited from, and resident in, the communities they police possess valuable knowledge of terrain, social networks, informal economies, community relationships, local flashpoints, transportation routes, settlement patterns and early-warning indicators.

A police officer who understands the local geography, communities, languages, social relationships, criminal networks, informal settlements, transportation corridors, markets, neighbourhoods and patterns of criminal activity possesses an operational advantage that cannot simply be produced through classroom training.

Continuing to staff FCT commands predominantly with officers drawn from other states who neither grew up in nor permanently reside in the Territory can reproduce the very knowledge deficit that state police is designed to cure.

That does not mean that officers transferred into the FCT from other parts of Nigeria are incapable or unprofessional. Far from it.

It means that local knowledge is an important security capability that should be deliberately developed rather than left to chance.

The result of failing to institutionalise local knowledge can be slower intelligence generation, weaker community cooperation and reduced preventive capacity in the seat of national government.

The FCT’s Unique Security Environment

The FCT is a complex security environment.

It contains established urban districts, rapidly expanding satellite communities, informal settlements, rural communities, diplomatic areas, government institutions, military establishments, major transportation corridors, commercial centres and critical national infrastructure.

Its security challenges are consequently different from those of many other parts of Nigeria.

Abuja is also home to the Presidency, National Assembly, Supreme Court, diplomatic missions, international organisations, military institutions, strategic government agencies and critical national infrastructure.

The policing of such an environment requires intimate knowledge of the Territory and a policing model capable of distinguishing between the security requirements of different communities and strategic locations.

Recruitment Should Prioritise Residents of the FCT

A locally constituted FCT Police Service should therefore place significant emphasis on recruiting qualified residents of the Federal Capital Territory.

This would not necessarily mean that every officer must be born in the FCT. Rather, recruitment should prioritise people who have demonstrable and meaningful residence, community knowledge and familiarity with the Territory.

The enabling legislation could provide for recruitment preference, or where appropriate a defined recruitment requirement, for persons resident in the FCT or indigenous to its Area Councils, subject to national minimum standards for education, training, vetting, physical fitness, professional conduct and competence.

The objective would be to develop a police force whose personnel have a direct understanding of the environment they are responsible for securing.

A locally recruited officer is more likely to understand the terrain, recognise unusual activity within familiar communities, communicate effectively with residents and develop trusted relationships with local sources of information.

This is particularly important for intelligence-led policing.

Community trust is an intelligence multiplier.

When residents know their police officers and believe that those officers understand and respect their communities, they are more likely to provide information about criminal activity.

That information can prevent crime before it happens.

1. More Police Boots on the Ground and Layered Capacity

The second major justification for decentralisation is capacity.

Nigeria needs more police officers and, more importantly, more police officers actually available for policing duties at the community level.

State police is intended to create an additional layer of policing resources rather than merely rebrand the existing force.

An FCT Police Service should operate as an additional layer within the national security architecture rather than simply replacing the Nigeria Police Force.

The Nigeria Police Force would continue to perform its national and federal responsibilities, while the FCT Police Service would provide localised policing within the Territory.

This would expand the total number of personnel available to address the FCT’s distinct security challenges, including urban density, high-value federal institutions, diplomatic presence, rapid population growth and the complex interface between planned districts and satellite settlements.

The result should be:

more personnel, more police posts, faster response, stronger community engagement and greater visibility.

In security operations, presence matters.

A police officer who is physically present in a community can respond much faster than an institution that must manage an enormous jurisdiction from a distant command structure.

Decentralisation should therefore not merely mean transferring administrative authority from one headquarters to another.

It should mean creating additional policing capacity.

1. Responsibility and Accountability

Decentralised policing is also fundamentally about accountability.

One of the central purposes of decentralisation is to place operational control and political accountability for day-to-day public safety in the hands of the elected or constitutionally designated executive authority of each jurisdiction.

If government gives a governor responsibility for the security of a state, it is reasonable that the governor should have meaningful influence over the policing architecture within that jurisdiction.

Governors will now be held responsible for the performance of their State Police Services.

The same principle should apply to the FCT.

If the FCT Minister is responsible for administering the Territory, the Federal Government should provide the Minister with an appropriate security instrument through which the government can respond more effectively to local security challenges.

The Minister of the FCT should likewise be accountable for the security of the Territory.

Leaving the FCT solely under a distant federal command structure severs that accountability link at the precise location where the consequences of security failure can have national consequences.

Accountability Must Accompany Authority

But decentralisation must not mean political ownership of the police.

An FCT Police Service must be professional, politically neutral, operationally disciplined and subject to strong institutional checks and balances.

The objective is not to create a private police force for any political office holder.

The objective is to create a professional public police service accountable to the people and institutions of the FCT.

There should therefore be clear safeguards against:

• political victimisation;
• selective enforcement;
• abuse of police powers;
• unlawful interference with investigations;
• suppression of lawful dissent;
• ethnic or religious discrimination;
• arbitrary arrests; and
• partisan deployment of police resources.

The solution to the possibility of abuse is not necessarily to maintain an ineffective centralised structure.

The solution is to design decentralisation with strong accountability mechanisms.

1. Democracy and the Residents of the FCT

There is also a fundamental democratic question that deserves serious consideration.

One of the principles behind democratic governance is that people should have meaningful influence over the institutions that govern and protect them.

Democracy demands that when you ask a people to govern themselves, you also must allow them to participate meaningfully in governing and protecting themselves.

The residents of the Federal Capital Territory are Nigerians.

They live, work, raise families, operate businesses, pay taxes and contribute to the development of the nation’s capital. They vote in national elections and live under laws made for them by the National Assembly acting in its national and FCT legislative capacities.

They face crime and insecurity like residents of every other part of Nigeria.

They should therefore not be treated as second-class citizens in the national conversation about police reform simply because of the peculiar constitutional status of the Territory in which they reside.

If the country concludes that communities are better protected when policing is closer to them, then the residents of the FCT deserve that same consideration.

You cannot ask people to participate in governance and simultaneously deny them meaningful local influence over the institutions responsible for their everyday security.

The constitutional peculiarities of the FCT should determine the form of its local police—not whether its residents deserve one.

A Comparative Example: Washington, D.C.

There is also a useful comparative example from the United States.

Washington, D.C., like the FCT, is a federal capital district rather than a state. Yet it has its own Metropolitan Police Department operating alongside multiple federal law-enforcement agencies.

The existence of local policing does not eliminate federal policing.

Instead, multiple layers of policing operate within the capital, each with clearly defined responsibilities and jurisdiction.

The lesson for Nigeria is not that the constitutional structures of the United States and Nigeria are identical. They are not.

The relevant lesson is operational:

A federal capital can have its own locally focused police service while federal law-enforcement agencies retain responsibility for federal interests.

Multilevel and multilayered policing can therefore strengthen rather than weaken the overall security architecture and ecosystem.

Nigeria can and should adapt this principle to the constitutional realities of the Federal Capital Territory.

The FCT Is a National Security Asset

There is another reason why this question deserves exceptional attention.

The FCT is not an ordinary local government area.

It is the political, administrative and symbolic heart of the Nigerian state.

The National Assembly is located there. The Presidency is located there. The Supreme Court is located there. Diplomatic missions, international organisations, military institutions, strategic government agencies and critical national infrastructure are concentrated there.

A significant security failure in the FCT can therefore have consequences far beyond the immediate community in which it occurs.

For that reason, the FCT should arguably have one of the most sophisticated, intelligence-driven and professionally integrated local policing systems in Nigeria.

It should not be the weakest link in Nigeria’s security architecture.

There is an established principle in systems security that the overall strength of a system is constrained by its weakest critical component.

In security matters, the country is only as strong as its weakest link.

If the rest of the country moves to a dual system that improves local knowledge, response times and accountability while the FCT remains locked into the old centralised model with its attendant detachment, the capital risks becoming the weakest link in the national security ecosystem.

Criminal networks, terrorists and other threat actors adapt to the path of least resistance.

A capital that is comparatively less well-served by locally knowledgeable and accountable policing becomes an attractive soft target and a potential staging ground that can undermine national stability.

Nigeria’s national security architecture should therefore not permit a major component—the Federal Capital Territory—to operate without the benefits of localised policing merely because its constitutional arrangement differs from that of the states.

A Two-Tier and Multi-Layered Security Architecture

The establishment of an FCT Police Service should not be interpreted as an argument for abolishing or weakening the Nigeria Police Force.

Rather, Nigeria should develop a complementary, multi-layered policing architecture.

The Nigeria Police Force should retain its national responsibilities, including federal policing functions, interstate operations, national investigations and other responsibilities assigned by law.

The FCT Police Service would concentrate on localised community policing within the Territory.

The two institutions should operate under clearly defined statutory responsibilities and robust mechanisms for cooperation, intelligence sharing, joint operations and mutual assistance.

This model could actually strengthen national security because it creates greater specialisation rather than greater fragmentation.

The Federal Police Service should retain exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over national-security offences, protection of federal institutions and assets, and other federal dimensions, in accordance with the constitutional and statutory framework governing the relationship between federal and local policing.

The FCT Police Service would address local and community-level policing while remaining integrated into the broader national security architecture.

This arrangement preserves federal supremacy where it is necessary while curing the operational and democratic deficits that justified decentralisation in the first place.

Practical Implementation Path

Nothing in the current constitutional architecture should be treated as preventing the National Assembly from establishing an FCT Police Service as part of the broader policing reform.

The enabling legislation can provide a clear and disciplined framework for its establishment, operation, oversight and relationship with the Nigeria Police Force.

A properly designed FCT Police Service could include the following:

1. Local recruitment: Prioritise qualified FCT residents or persons with demonstrable and meaningful residence in the Territory, including appropriate consideration for persons indigenous to the Area Councils, subject to national minimum standards for training, vetting, competence and professional conduct.
2. Community-based deployment: Assign officers to communities and districts for sustained periods rather than constantly rotating personnel, thereby allowing them to develop local knowledge and trusted relationships.
3. Specialised urban policing: Develop units focused on the unique challenges of the capital Territory, including urban crime, critical infrastructure protection, diplomatic environments and high-density communities.
4. Rural and satellite-community policing: Give adequate attention to communities outside the core city, including rural settlements and rapidly expanding satellite communities.
5. Intelligence-led policing: Integrate community intelligence with modern surveillance, data analysis, investigative capabilities and appropriate technology.
6. Integrated command: Establish clear coordination mechanisms with the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies.
7. Professional standards: Require rigorous training, continuous professional development, national minimum standards and strict disciplinary procedures.
8. Independent complaints mechanisms: Give residents accessible and credible channels for reporting police misconduct and obtaining redress.
9. Legislative oversight: Provide strong oversight through the National Assembly in its appropriate legislative and oversight capacity concerning the FCT.
10. Executive accountability: Make the FCT’s responsible political and administrative authorities answerable for policing outcomes without permitting partisan control of police operations.
11. Transparent funding: Establish predictable, sustainable and accountable funding mechanisms.
12. Technology-enabled policing: Use modern communications, databases, digital evidence, geographic information systems and other appropriate technologies to improve response, intelligence and investigation.
13. Clearly defined command: Vest operational command in a Commissioner of Police appointed through a transparent statutory process, with the precise appointment, recommendation and confirmation mechanisms defined by the enabling legislation and aligned with the broader Nigeria Police reform framework.
14. Ministerial policy responsibility: Empower the Minister of the FCT to issue lawful written directives of a general policy nature concerning public safety and public order within the Territory, while preserving the operational and professional independence of the police.
15. Federal jurisdiction safeguards: Maintain the Federal Police Service’s jurisdiction over national-security offences, federal institutions and assets and other matters properly reserved to federal authorities.
16. Inter-agency cooperation: Establish statutory mechanisms for intelligence sharing, joint operations, mutual assistance and resolution of jurisdictional conflicts between the FCT Police Service, the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies.

This arrangement would preserve federal supremacy where necessary while ensuring that local policing is genuinely local.

The Objective Should Be Better Policing, Not More Political Control

It is important to emphasise that the argument for an FCT Police Service is not an argument for politicising policing.

Nigeria must avoid replacing one problem with another.

A decentralised police structure must be accompanied by constitutional safeguards, professional standards, independent oversight and clearly defined operational autonomy.

The police must serve the law, not the political interests of whoever occupies an office.

The responsibility of government should be to provide the police with the resources, personnel, training and institutional framework required to protect citizens, while ensuring that police powers are exercised lawfully and professionally.

The goal should therefore be better policing, greater accountability, stronger local intelligence and improved public safety—not greater political control of the police.

Conclusion

The current national conversation on police reform presents Nigeria with an opportunity to build a policing architecture that reflects the realities of the 21st century.

The central questions should be simple:

Who understands the community? Who is closest to the people? Who can respond fastest? Who can gather the best local intelligence? Who should be held accountable when security fails?

If the answer to those questions is that policing should be brought closer to the people, then the Federal Capital Territory cannot logically be excluded.

The FCT may not have a governor elected under the same constitutional arrangement as the states. It may not have a State House of Assembly. But it has millions of residents, a defined territory, an established administrative structure, a constitutionally recognised government and an enormous national security responsibility.

The President exercises constitutional authority over the FCT through the established administrative framework, including the Minister of the FCT. The National Assembly possesses legislative authority over the Territory and has exercised that authority for decades.

Consequently, the absence of a conventional governor and State House of Assembly should not be treated as an insurmountable barrier.

Excluding the Federal Capital Territory from the state-police reform on the ground that it lacks a governor and a State House of Assembly is a formalistic argument that ignores both the constitutional framework of the FCT and the functional reality of its governance.

The same reasons that compelled the nation to reconsider exclusive centralised policing for the 36 states compel the creation of an equivalent local police service for the FCT.

Failure to do so will leave the capital structurally disadvantaged precisely when the rest of the country is being strengthened.

Where there is an administrative responsibility, there should be an appropriate security capability. Where there is security responsibility, there must be accountability. And where people live, there must be policing that understands them.

The reform of Nigeria’s police system should therefore include a clear constitutional and legislative pathway for establishing an FCT Police Service, recruited substantially from qualified residents of the Territory, professionally trained, properly equipped, operationally accountable and integrated with the Nigeria Police Force and other national security agencies.

Nigeria should not build a decentralised policing system for 36 states and leave the Federal Capital Territory operating under the very centralised policing model that the reform itself seeks to correct.

The FCT should not be the exception that proves the rule.

It should be part of the solution.

I therefore respectfully urge the National Assembly, the Presidential Working Group and all stakeholders involved in the ongoing police reform process to include an FCT Police Service, properly constituted from residents of the Territory and placed under the administrative authority of the Minister of the FCT, acting for the President, as an integral and non-negotiable component of Nigeria’s new policing architecture.

The residents of the Federal Capital Territory deserve a policing system that understands them, is present among them, is accountable for their security and is capable of responding to the unique security demands of Nigeria’s capital.

And Nigeria deserves nothing less for the security of its capital.

(Capt. Bishop C. Johnson can be reached via Email: b.chuck.johnson@gmail.com)