When the Supreme Court Speaks, Politics Must Now Follow the Law: The Electoral Act 2026, Membership Registers, Party Primaries, and the Limits of Political Discretion

…A Legal Perspective on the Supreme Court’s Judgment on the Electoral Act 2026

By Dr. Olukayode Ajulo, OON, SAN

The Supreme Court has spoken. We must now allow the law to speak through our conduct.

On 24 September 2026, the Supreme Court allowed INEC’s appeal in the dispute concerning Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2) of the Electoral Act 2026. It set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal and restored the judgment of the Federal High Court.

The immediate consequence is clear, but it is worth stating it correctly. The Supreme Court did not make these provisions law. They were enacted by the National Assembly. What the Supreme Court has now authoritatively determined is that the provisions challenged before it are not unconstitutional on the grounds upon which they were challenged. That distinction matters.

The provisions remain part of the law governing our electoral process, and they must be treated accordingly. The reports of the judgment indicate that the seven-member panel, led by Justice Adamu Jauro, specifically upheld Sections 77(5), (6), and (7), as well as Section 84(2), and held that they were not inconsistent with the 1999 Constitution.

There is another point that deserves emphasis because it goes to the heart of the constitutional argument. Section 228(a) of the Constitution expressly empowers the National Assembly to make laws providing guidelines and rules to ensure internal democracy within political parties, including laws regulating the conduct of party primaries, congresses, and conventions.

Indeed, in President, Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor v National Assembly & Ors (2022), the Supreme Court considered the scope of this constitutional power and recognised that the legislative authority of the National Assembly extends to making laws concerning internal party affairs within the constitutional limits prescribed by Section 228(a). That is significant.

The autonomy of political parties is real. But it is not an autonomy exercised in a constitutional vacuum. Party autonomy operates within the Constitution and within legislation validly enacted pursuant to the Constitution. The Supreme Court’s present judgment must therefore be understood against that constitutional architecture.

There has been understandable public interest in the fact that the Court of Appeal had earlier reached a different conclusion. There is nothing unusual about that in the life of litigation. Courts sometimes disagree, and that is precisely why our judicial system has appellate courts. The important point is that the Supreme Court is the apex court.

Section 287(1) of the Constitution is unequivocal: “The decisions of the Supreme Court shall be enforced in any part of the Federation by all authorities and persons, and by courts with subordinate jurisdiction to that of the Supreme Court.” That constitutional command is not ornamental.

The Supreme Court has now set aside the contrary decision of the Court of Appeal. The latter therefore cannot continue to be treated as the prevailing judicial position on the constitutional questions determined by the apex court. As the Supreme Court itself has repeatedly emphasised, its decisions bind the lower courts and must be given effect. The controversy has therefore moved from interpretation to compliance.

Sections 77(5), 77(6), and 77(7) concern the membership register of political parties and its use in congresses, conventions, and primaries. Following the Supreme Court’s decision, these provisions should no longer be approached as though their constitutional validity remains an open question. They are operative provisions of the Electoral Act.

A political party that is required by law to submit a membership register to INEC cannot reasonably treat that register as a document that may be disregarded whenever it becomes inconvenient. The Supreme Court’s decision does not, of course, prevent whatever lawful administrative corrections or updates the Electoral Act or valid regulations permit. But the governing principle is straightforward. A statutory requirement cannot be reduced to a matter of political convenience.

The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has long recognised that not every disagreement within a political party is justiciable. In Onuoha v Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244, the Court established the traditional principle concerning the internal affairs of political parties. That principle has subsequently been considered in cases including Shinkafi v Yari (2016) and APGA v Anyanwu. But there is an important qualification. Where the legislature has expressly regulated an aspect of the electoral process, compliance with that statutory regime is a matter of law.

Indeed, in PDP v Lawal (2023), the Supreme Court recognised that an allegation of non-compliance with statutory requirements governing the nomination process could properly engage the jurisdiction of the courts. So, the proposition that political parties have internal autonomy cannot be stretched into a proposition that statutory electoral requirements are optional. Autonomy is not immunity from the law.

This is why Section 84(2) deserves equal attention. The same reasoning applies to Section 84(2), which provides for direct primaries or consensus as methods of nominating candidates.

The Supreme Court has now upheld the constitutional validity of that statutory framework in the case before it. The Court has not invented a new method of party nomination. Rather, it has determined that the statutory framework enacted by the National Assembly is not unconstitutional on the grounds presented in the litigation.

Political parties therefore need to examine their nomination procedures carefully and ensure that their internal processes conform to the Electoral Act. The principle is neither complicated nor controversial: political parties are free to conduct their affairs within the law; they are not free to conduct their affairs outside it.

Therefore, my word to political parties and aspirants will be to urge them to take this judgment seriously and to do so without partisan colour. This is not a judgment that should be viewed simply as a victory for INEC or a setback for a particular political party. It is a judgment of the Supreme Court.

Every political party should therefore review its membership register, congress and convention arrangements, primary procedures, nomination guidelines, and relevant electoral timetable against the Electoral Act as it now stands.

Aspirants should also do the same. No serious aspirant should leave the legality of the process to chance and hope to resolve it in court after the political contest is over. We have seen enough of that. A candidate should emerge from a lawful process, not become lawful merely because he or she has emerged. That distinction is worth remembering.

INEC should now give clear and practical effect to the judgment. Its guidelines and communications to political parties should reflect the law as it has been authoritatively interpreted by the Supreme Court, and it should make the relevant requirements clear, communicate applicable timelines properly, and apply the law consistently to all political parties.

However, there is an equally important caution. INEC must administer the law; it must not make the law. The Commission cannot use its regulatory powers to add requirements that Parliament has not imposed, just as it cannot disregard requirements that Parliament has imposed and the courts have upheld. Its strength lies not in making electoral law but in administering it fairly, faithfully, and within the limits of its constitutional and statutory mandate.

And as patriots, we must learn to accept judicial decisions. This is a broader issue that, in my view, deserves attention. We must develop a stronger culture of accepting judicial decisions, particularly decisions of the apex court.

It is perfectly legitimate to disagree with a judgment. It is equally legitimate, where the law permits, to seek an appropriate judicial remedy. What is not acceptable in a constitutional democracy is for institutions or political actors to select the parts of a judgment that suit them and disregard the rest.

Section 287(1) does not say that Supreme Court decisions shall be obeyed when convenient. It says they shall be enforced. The rule of law cannot operate on a pick-and-choose basis. So we should let 2027 elections begin with compliance.

The 2027 elections are still ahead of us. There is therefore time for political parties and aspirants to look carefully at their processes, identify areas of possible non-compliance, and correct them lawfully before they become disputes. That would be far better than conducting questionable processes today and asking the courts to rescue them tomorrow.

The lesson of this judgment, to my mind, is simple. The Supreme Court has settled the constitutional controversy before it. The Court of Appeal’s contrary decision has been set aside. The statutory provisions upheld by the Supreme Court remain operative.

The duty of political parties is to comply. The duty of aspirants is to understand the law before entering the contest. The duty of INEC is to administer the law fairly, consistently, and within the limits of its statutory powers. And the duty of all of us is to remember that elections are not conducted in a legal vacuum.

Politics may be about competition. But the rules of that competition are determined by law. The Supreme Court has spoken. Let us now allow the law to do its work.

Dr. Ajulo is the Attorney-General and Commissioner for Justice, Ondo State.