The Tyranny Of Words: Hate Speech, The Mediaeval Lesson, The Renaissance Of Reason, And The Limits Of Liberty
Hate Speech, Constitutional Responsibility and the Imperative of National Renewal
By Olukayode A. Ajulo
Civilisations are not destroyed by weapons alone. Sometimes, they begin to unravel through the corruption and misadventure of language, the normalisation of contempt and the gradual abandonment of respect for the humanity of others.
History offers us a sobering lesson. During the mediaeval period, Europe witnessed how religious intolerance, sectarian antagonism, persecution and the manipulation of collective beliefs could fracture societies and legitimise cruelty. The age was not without its intellectual achievements: mediaeval universities, scholastic philosophy and the works of thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas laid important foundations for modern jurisprudence and political morality. Yet, its darker episodes remind us of the dangers inherent in societies where dogma overwhelms reason and difference becomes grounds for persecution.
One particularly disturbing episode occurred in 1348, when the Black Death swept across Europe. Amid widespread fear and uncertainty, Jewish communities were falsely accused of poisoning wells and deliberately spreading the plague. Rumour became accepted as truth, prejudice acquired the appearance of public conviction, and innocent people were persecuted and massacred.
In Strasbourg, Basel and other European towns, human lives were sacrificed at the altar of fabricated accusations.
The tragedy was not merely that people believed a lie. It was that the lie was repeated until it became a justification for cruelty. Words created suspicion; suspicion produced hostility; hostility legitimised violence. The sequence is as old as human civilisation and, unfortunately, as contemporary as our social media timelines.
The Renaissance emerged as one of humanity’s great intellectual awakenings. Thinkers such as Erasmus and Pico della Mirandola championed learning, human dignity, intellectual inquiry and the capacity of reason to elevate society. It was a rediscovery of the human person as an individual deserving of dignity, rather than an object of collective suspicion or ideological hostility.
It is therefore profoundly troubling that, in our supposedly enlightened age, public discourse is increasingly exhibiting some of the very tendencies history ought to have taught us to overcome.
Nigeria must confront this reality, particularly in the build-up to next year’s general elections.
Hate speech is not simply an unfortunate choice of words. When deliberately deployed to dehumanise communities, provoke hostility or incite violence, it becomes a threat to public order, democratic stability and national cohesion. A democracy must tolerate dissent, even when uncomfortable, but it must not surrender its public space to threats, persecution and organised hatred.
John Stuart Mill’s philosophical defence of liberty in On Liberty remains instructive: individual freedom deserves protection, but its exercise cannot be divorced from the harm it may inflict upon others. Liberty is not a licence to destroy the liberty, security and dignity of fellow citizens.
Our constitutional and statutory framework recognises this delicate balance. Section 39 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 guarantees freedom of expression, while section 45 permits restrictions reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, including those necessary to protect public safety, public order and the rights and freedoms of others.
More importantly, Nigeria is not without laws addressing the menace of hate speech and incitement. The challenge is partly one of awareness, consistent enforcement and respect for constitutional safeguards.
The Cybercrimes (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act 2015, as amended in 2024, is particularly significant. Section 26 specifically criminalises certain racist and xenophobic offences committed through computer systems or networks. These include making racist or xenophobic material available to the public, threatening individuals or groups on specified racial, ethnic or related grounds, and publicly insulting persons because of their membership of such groups. The provision carries a penalty of up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to ₦10 million, or both.
Similarly, section 417 of the Penal Code applicable in the relevant Northern jurisdictions criminalises the excitation of hatred or contempt against a class of persons where such conduct endangers public peace. The offence attracts imprisonment of up to three years, a fine, or both.
The Criminal Code Act, applicable in the relevant Southern jurisdictions, also addresses related conduct. Section 42 criminalises promoting inter-communal war; section 59 addresses the publication of false news with intent to cause fear and alarm to the public; and section 204 criminalises insulting a religion. These provisions address distinct offences and should not be treated as a blanket prohibition of every offensive or unpopular opinion.
The Electoral Act 2026 provides another important safeguard. Section 96 prohibits political campaigns and slogans tainted with abusive language likely to injure religious, ethnic, tribal or sectional feelings, as well as language designed or likely to provoke violent reactions. Section 101 also prohibits campaigning or broadcasting based on religious, tribal or sectional considerations for the purpose of promoting or opposing a political party or candidate.
These are not merely ornamental provisions. They represent the legislative recognition that political competition must not become an avenue for manufacturing communal hostility.
Our jurisprudence equally provides important guidance. In Chief Arthur Nwankwo v The State (1985) 6 NCLR 228, the Court of Appeal emphatically defended freedom of expression and the right to criticise those in public office, declaring the colonial sedition provisions inconsistent with constitutional guarantees. The judgement remains an important reminder that laws ostensibly designed to protect public order must never become convenient weapons for silencing legitimate dissent.
The European Court of Human Rights, in Handyside v United Kingdom (1976), affirmed that freedom of expression extends even to ideas that offend, shock or disturb. In Jersild v Denmark (1994), the Court demonstrated the importance of distinguishing the responsible reporting of hateful statements from their endorsement or promotion.
These authorities establish an essential proposition: neither liberty nor its restriction should be exercised arbitrarily.
Recent developments in the United Kingdom reinforce the urgency of this debate. On 9 November 2026, Kieran Kyle was sentenced to 20 weeks’ imprisonment for offensive communications involving racist abuse and death threats against Conservative Party Leader Kemi Badenoch. This was not a prosecution for expressing an unpopular political opinion; it involved targeted communications containing threats and racial abuse. It is a reminder that intimidation of elected representatives threatens not merely individual security but the integrity of democratic participation.
Nigeria must draw the appropriate lesson. We must neither criminalise dissent nor romanticise dangerous speech. The answer lies in principled legislation, impartial enforcement, responsible political leadership, digital accountability and sustained civic education.
Our politicians, religious leaders, traditional institutions, journalists and social media influencers must appreciate that words carry consequences. Those who occupy positions of influence have a particular obligation to elevate public conversation rather than exploit ethnic, religious and political differences for transient advantage.
The mediaeval experience warns us about the destructive consequences of intolerance; the Renaissance reminds us of the liberating power of reason; and constitutional democracy challenges us to reconcile liberty with responsibility. These are not merely historical epochs. They are enduring choices confronting every generation.
Nigeria needs a new intellectual and civic renaissance: one in which disagreement does not become hostility, political competition does not degenerate into ethnic warfare, and freedom of expression is exercised with an appreciation of human dignity.
Ultimately, freedom of expression must remain the lifeblood of democracy, but hatred must never become its oxygen.
A society that has learnt nothing from the intolerance of the Middle Ages and has forgotten the humanism of the Renaissance risks surrendering its future to the tyranny of words. Civilisation advances when reason governs speech, justice disciplines power and humanity restrains prejudice.
Nigeria must not wait for the consequences of hatred to become irreversible before taking this lesson seriously. Our collective responsibility is to preserve the freedom to speak while ensuring that no citizen is stripped of dignity, security or belonging because of the words of another.
The progression here is deliberate, not accidental. The Middle Ages stand as a sobering reminder of the terrible price humanity has paid for the tyranny of prejudice, intolerance and ignorance. The Renaissance, by contrast, illuminates what humanity can achieve when reason, enlightenment and human dignity triumph. Having travelled so far in the long march of civilisation, we must not, in the twenty-first century, permit the primitive politics of hatred to reverse the hard-won gains of human progress.
A nation is ultimately measured not only by the freedoms it proclaims but also by the humanity with which its people exercise them.
Freedom must have room to breathe, dissent must have room to flourish, but hatred must never be allowed to become the language of our common destiny.

